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The great transition: Implication from environmental
policy on the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ on children
Abstract
We develop an overlapping-generations model with human capital accumulation
and endogenous fertility containing a pollution externality. In such a framework, we
study the eﬀects of an environmental policy change on individuals’ quality-quantity
trade-oﬀ on children. In a Malthusian poverty trap, we show that a more stringent
policy induces a reduction of the fertility rate. In a state of perpetual development,
however, not only is this policy likely to have a positive eﬀect on fertility, but we
also obtain that environmental quality, growth, and welfare are compatible goals.
Moreover, we show that an abatement pollution policy can be used as an instrument
for initiating a country’s “great transition” from a state of poverty to a state of
development.
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1 Introduction
The relation between economic development and environmental quality is a complex issue
which is the subject of a long-lasting debate in the literature (see, e.g., Ricci, 2007, for
a comprehensive survey). While some argue that higher growth and better environment
are competing goals (see, e.g., Ligthart and van der Ploeg, 1994; Grimaud, 1999), others
suggest that there is no conflict between the two (see, e.g., Porter and Van der Linde,
1995; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Hart, 2004; Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007). The
present paper joins into this debate and, specifically, it aims at showing that not only
can growth and environmental quality be mutually compatible, but also environmental
regulation can be used as an instrument to switch an economy from a state of poverty to
a state of perpetual development.
It is by now well admitted that pollution, notably via its impact on individuals’ health,
represents a serious predicament for economic development.1 As argued by Aloi and
Tournemaine (2011) among others, improvements in health represent the main
benefits from environmental regulations because it aﬀects individuals’ partic-
ipation to the labour market and learning abilities. In eﬀect, on the empirical
side, Young et al. (2005) argue for instance that the greatest benefits of
the U.S. air pollution regulation are those associated with improved human
health: The authors have evaluated the market and non market eﬀects of air
pollution in the U.S. for the period 1970 to 2000, and found that the greatest
benefits of the regulation are those associated with improved human health.
Formally, they computed that air pollution regulation led to a welfare gain
increase from about $50 billion in 1975 to about $400 billion in 2000 (in 1997
dollars).2 Similarly, the World Bank (2007) has evaluated the health damages
caused by air pollution in China at nearly 4% of GDP. On the theoretical
side several authors such as Gradus and Smulders (1993), van Ewijk and van
Wijnbergen (1994) and Pautrel (2008, 2009) have therefore developed frame-
works accounting for a link between individual human capital and pollution
1See, for instance, Kunzli (2002) and the World Health Organisation report on Health
Aspect of Air Pollution (2004).
2See Pautrel (2008) for further and more detailed observations on this issue.
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emissions.3 Their common finding is that a better quality of the environment is com-
patible with a higher level of growth. The reason is that, in their framework, a better
environmental quality leads to an increase of individual productivity in the human cap-
ital accumulation sector (e.g. Gradus and Smulders; van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen) or
life expectancy (Pautrel, 2008; 2009). Thereby, individuals allocate more time to skills
acquisition which is growth enhancing.
An important choice variable which is omitted in the analyses, however, is the num-
ber of children individuals decide to bring up. As mentioned by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004), it is surprising that such variable is rarely a focus of its own in growth models: this
variable is often treated as an exogenous parameter although it is obviously endogenous.
Furthermore, the link between human capital and fertility has been recognized for many
years in the literature both theoretically and empirically (see, e.g., Cochrane,
1979 and other references cited below). It is usually argued that there exists
a trade-oﬀ regarding individuals’ decisions between the quality and quantity
of their children. Interestingly, not only does such trade-oﬀ allow to cap-
ture the observed negative correlation between the level of human capital of
individuals and the number of children they decide to bring up but also to
explain the transition of economies from a stage of stagnation (poverty trap)
to perpetual growth (see, e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990; hereafter
BMT), i.e. the idea according to which economic development goes along with a
general decline in fertility rates and an increase in investment in education (see, e.g., Ga-
lor and Weil, 1999; Doepke, 2004; Galor, 2005). The bottom line of this is that if an
abatement pollution policy can aﬀect the human capital accumulation process
of individuals as stated above, it is also likely to alter their fertility choice via
the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ they face. That is, in this paper, we argue that
a more stringent environmental policy could be a factor helping to initiate a
“great transition” for some developing countries, i.e. a tool favouring a switch
3The idea that health represents an important component of human capital can be attributed to Gross-
man (1972). More recently, several authors, among which Weil (2008), have provided empir-
ical evidence supporting the idea that health aﬀects productivity both directly (healthier
individuals make better workers) and indirectly (healthier individuals acquire more skills).
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from a poverty trap to a state of perpetual development. Interestingly, such
channel of transmission of environmental policy to growth and development is
reminiscent of the concluding remarks by Ricci (2007, p. 697) stating, about
the empirical work by Chay and Greenstone (2003) among others,4 that the
observation of the negative impact of pollution on children’s health and mor-
tality supports the idea (suggested and developed here) of a parallel increase
in education.
In line with this strand of reasoning, we thus develop a model connecting the ideas of
endogenous human capital accumulation and fertility choices (or endogenous population
growth) in which environmental quality plays a key role. To the best of our knowledge,
capturing all these features in a single model has not been done in the environmental eco-
nomic literature, although some authors have discussed, to some extent, the connections
between them. For instance, Cronshaw and Requate (1997) study the eﬀects of a change
in the exogenous population growth rate on the environment in a static context; Harford
(1997, 1998) investigates the issue in a dynamic model with endogenous fertility, but does
not include any production sector. Finally, Schou (2002), who has the closest framework
to ours, builds on Harford (1997, 1998) to analyse in which case an explicit family policy
is necessary to implement an optimal allocation of resources.
The advantage of our approach with respect to the aforecited literature is twofold.
First, we can study how changes in environmental policy aﬀects the decisions of individ-
uals to invest in human capital accumulation and to bring up children. Second, we can
assess both the immediate and long-run impact of an environmental policy on growth
and welfare, as well as its transitional dynamic implications. To get there, we borrow
the endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation developed by BMT in
which we introduce the notion that pollution aﬀects individuals’ human capital accumu-
lation process (i.e. learning abilities), and thus in turn, the so-called quality-quantity
trade-oﬀ on children. Interestingly, the framework has the nice property to display two
stable steady-state equilibria: i) a Malthusian poverty trap where individuals choose to
4Specifically, Chay and Greenstone (2003) estimate that a one percent decrease in total
suspended particles in the US during the period 1981-1982 has led to a 0.35 percent decline
in the infant mortality.
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have a high number of children but do not invest in their human capital accumulation;
and ii) a stable state of persistent and self-sustaining growth where individuals choose to
have less children but invest a strictly positive amount of resources in their human capital
accumulation process.
In a nutshell, we show that, in the long run, an abatement pollution policy induces
individuals to reduce the number of children they bring up when the economy is stuck in a
(poor) Malthusian steady state. The reason is that the policy change leads to a reduction
of the rate of return to investments in the number of children parents choose to bring up.
Interestingly, in the perpetual growing steady state this eﬀect is further accompanied by
a productivity gain in the human capital accumulation sector which oﬀsets the negative
impact on fertility. In other words, in this case there is a positive impact both on the
number of children and on their rate of skills acquisition.5
Another noteworthy result of the paper is that a better environmental quality and a
greater level of growth and welfare are compatible goals. The reason is that we obtain a
non linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between environmental regulation and growth
reminiscent of the seminal work by Barro (1990). Unlike the author, however, we show
that, in general, the welfare maximising amount of abatement is lower than the growth
maximising one; moreover, its level should be set lower in the Malthusian steady state
than in the perpetual growing one. In this context, given that the abatement policy level
positively aﬀects the return to investments in human capital, we demonstrate that such
policy can be used as an instrument to switch an economy from the Malthusian to the
perpetual growing steady state.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we examine its key properties. We conclude in Section 4.
5These results are close to those derived by Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2010) who develop
a similar setup to ours. However, the authors mainly focus on socio-macroeconomic issues,
namely the potential impact of social status on the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ on children,
thereby its potential eﬀect on economic development.
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2 Model
The main building block of the model is taken from BMT and Tournemaine and Tsoukis
(2011). We depart from the authors and go one step further as we add the environmental
dimension to the standard framework. This will allow us to analyse the impact of an
abatement policy on the number of children, human capital accumulation, long-term
growth and welfare.
We consider an economy where time, denoted by  is discrete and goes from 0 to ∞.
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live for two periods:
childhood and adulthood. All decisions are made in the adult period of life. Each adult
individual is endowed with   0 units of labor-time supplied inelastically between the
production of a polluting output and raising children to adulthood. Technologies and
preferences are described below.
The technology for output is given by:
 =  (1)
where  is the time spent by an adult to the production of output and  is her level of
human capital.
Each unit of output production yields one unit of pollution emissions that can be
reduced through abatement activities, . For simplicity, abatements are public activities,
though it would be equivalent to consider that these were private activities. Our approach
can be rationalised by appealing to the fact that governments may actually promote the
adoption of technologies that reduce pollution originating from the use of resources - such
as coal or fuel - impairing air quality. Abatements are financed through a flat tax rate 
levied on output production:  = . Moreover, we focus on the immediate eﬀects of
emissions, such as air pollution, whose implications on human capital are for the most part
direct and are drastically reduced when addressed (see, e.g., Kunzli 2002). Accordingly,
we treat pollution, , as a flow and set
 =
µ

¶
= ()− , (2)
where   0 Treating pollution emissions as a by-product of production that can be
reduced by devoting part of output to abatement is common practice in the environmental
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literature. This is motivated by two main reasons. First, its simplicity: as the flow of
pollution is constant at each instant of time, it facilitates the investigation of the main
properties of the model at steady state and along the transition. Second, as pointed out
by Forster (1973) among others, the functional form (2) can be taken as an approximation
for emissions due to air pollution; that is the polluting factor at the centre of our analysis.6
One consequence of pollution is the deterioration of individuals’ human capital. For
simplicity, following van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen (1994) and Pautrel (2008, 2009), Aloi
and Tournemaine (2013) among others, we set the technology of human capital as
+1 =  ()−  + 0 (3)
where   0 is a productivity parameter,   0 measures the strength of pollution
emissions on human capital accumulation,  is the amount of material resources invested
and 0 is the innate level of skills. Note that a strictly positive and constant long-run
growth rate can be achieved if   0 and  grows at the same rate as  which will
be the case in steady state. Moreover, even if there is no labour-time in the production
function (3), and thus, even if teachers are not explicitly modelled, the main idea is that
their existence is implicitly assumed. Such technology has been used and discussed by de
la Croix and Michel (2002, see e.g. chapter 5) among others. The justification is that the
standard trade-oﬀ which occurs between output production (consumption) and human
6As mentioned by Aloi and Tournemaine (2013), the functional form (2) implies that with zero abate-
ment ( = 0) pollution tends to infinity. This undesirable property can easily be fixed by assuming
that technological change aﬀects the productivity of abatement. As clarified by Bretschger and Smulders
(2007), for consistency, technology and input eﬀects of abatement should be distinct. Formally, this
amounts to replace technology (2) with
 =  min
(µ 
0
¶−1

µ

¶−1)
,
where   1 and  = max{0 } The latter captures the learning-by-abating technology, or pro-
ductivity eﬀect of abatement. The lower bound on  ensures that: (i) with zero abatement, pollution
is proportional to output, and (ii) a minimum initial amount is required for abatement to start to be
eﬀective. Our specification (2) remains valid, as long as a minimum level of abatement is in place, and
satisfies 0    . Hence, the pollution technology adopted in the paper should be interpreted as a
specific case of this more general functional form.
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capital accumulation in the case of a model where labour-time is an input of the human
capital accumulation process, is directly taken into account via the amount of resources
devoted to human capital accumulation.7
Another consequence of pollution is the deterioration of individuals’ utility given by
 = [() ()
−]1−
1−  +  ()
1− +1 (4)
where 0    1, 0      1,   0 measures the strength of the negative impact
of pollution on individuals’ utility,  is the per-capita level of consumption of an adult
individual,  is the number of children that a parent has and +1 is the level of utility
that a child will attain as an adult, i.e. parents and children are linked through altruism
(see, e.g., Barro and Becker, 1988 and 1989). In that sense, parameters  and  are the
elasticity of altruism with respect to the number of children and the degree of altruism of
parents toward children.
To close the model, we assume that, to bring up each child to adulthood, it also takes
a fixed amount of time,   0, and of consumption good,   0. Therefore, the resource
and time constraints of an individual are given by
(1− )  =  + ( + ) (5)
and
 +  =  (6)
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterise the equilibrium of the model. We proceed in three steps.
First, we derive the eﬃciency conditions. Second, we characterise the steady state and
analyse the implications of a change in the abatement policy level on economic variables
and individuals’ welfare. Finally, we characterise and analyse the transitional dynamics.
7It is possible to argue that 0 should be aﬀected by pollution. However, such assumption would imply
a long-run level of human capital equal to zero if  = 0 Thus, we choose to rule out this possibility.
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3.1 The representative individual’s problem
Using (1)-(6), after substitution, the individual’s maximisation problem can be written
as
max+1
1
1−
nh
(1− ) ( − ) −
³+1−0
 + 
´

i

o(1−)
+ ()1− +1(+1)

Manipulation of the first order condition with respect to  yields
 (1− ) ()− +1(+1) = [(1− )  + ( + )] ()− (1−) (7)
stating that the marginal utility gain of an additional child on the left hand side equals
its cost in terms of time and output on the right hand side.
Manipulation of the first order condition with respect to +1 yields

 ()
− (1−) ≥  ()1− +1+1  (8)
where equality holds if   0 Moreover, the envelope condition implies
+1
+1 = (1− ) ( − +1) (+1)
− (1−) (9)
Combining (8) and (9) yieldsµ+1

¶
≥  (1− ) ()− ( − +1)  (10)
where the left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of
parents and children and the right hand side represents the return of investments in
human capital.
3.2 Steady state
3.2.1 Characterisation and properties
Using the results derived in the previous sub-section, we can show that two stable steady-
state equilibria can emerge depending on whether individuals invest in education of their
children or not. First, there is a stable Malthusian poverty trap. In this case, (10) reads
with a strict inequality implying  = 0 and  = 0 at each instant. Second, there is a
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stable state of persistent and self-sustaining growth. In this case, (10) reads with equality.
Investments in education put the economy on a development path characterised by   0
and +1   at each instant. Let us mention that there exists an unstable state of
intermediate development, as well. In this case, (10) reads with equality, but parents
invest an amount of resources which is just enough to maintain the level of human capital
constant over-time implying zero long-run growth:   0 and +1 =  at each instant.
Due to its unstable nature, we relegate its characterisation to Appendix 5.1.3 to focus on
the two stable steady states which are more meaningful for the analysis. For simplicity,
results are gathered in Proposition 1 where we drop the time index for constant variables
and use the symbols “” and “” to denote the value of variables in the Malthusian and
perpetual growing steady states, respectively. Furthermore, for convenience, we assume
the following parameter restrictions:
Assumption 1:
(1− )
h
 −  ()1(−1)
i
0 −  ()1(−1)
(1− ) 0 +   0
Assumption 2:
 (1− ) (1− )
( − )  1
Assumption 1 guarantees the uniqueness of the solution for the equilibrium number
of children in the Malthusian steady state. Assumption 2 guarantees the existence of
a growing steady state where the amount of resources allocated to teaching activities is
strictly positive.
Proposition 1 In the Malthusian steady state, parents do not invest in education of their
children ( = 0) which leads to zero economic growth ( = 0). The number of children
they bring up,   is unique. It is solution of the following equation:
(1− ) ( −  )0 − 
(1− ) 0 +  =
(1− ) [( ) −  ]
 (1− )  (11)
and verifies
0   (1− ) ( )− ( −  )  1 (12)
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In the growing steady state, the relative amount of output allocated to human capital
accumulation,  is constant and given by

 =
(1− ) (1− ) 
( − )  (13)
The number of children,  parents bring up is given by
∙
(1− ) 
( − )
¸
=  [ (1− )]1− ()− ( − )  (14)
The common growth rate of consumption and human capital, , is given by
 = 
 (1− ) (1− )
( − ) − 1 (15)
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.
Beyond the intuitive result that the Malthusian steady state is characterised by a
greater number of children compared to the state of perpetual development (i.e.   
evident from equations 12 and 14 under the parameter restrictions given in Appendix 6.1),
Proposition 1 allows us to examine the eﬀects of a change in the abatement policy level
on the choice of the number of children per individual and human capital investments.
We can check that the abatement policy level has a diﬀerent impact on the choice of the
number of children, depending on whether the economy is in the Malthusian state or if
it is on the path of perpetual development. Starting with equation (11), we notice that
  0. Intuitively, a higher abatement policy level reduces the available income of
individuals which, in turn, increases the relative cost of bringing up additional children.
Interestingly, in the growing steady state, this eﬀect is accompanied by an increase of
the productivity in the human capital accumulation sector (see 3), synonymous with a
greater income level. This means that the contribution of abatements to the reduction
of pollution emissions can compensate the resource withdrawal eﬀect depicted previously.
More precisely, we have   0 for low initial values of  and   0 for high
initial values of   The noteworthy feature of these two eﬀects is that they also apply
for growth (see equation 15) despite the lower relative amount of resources devoted to
human capital accumulation (see equation 13). Specifically, the number of children per
individual,  and the long-run level of growth,  are characterised by an inverted-U
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relation with respect to   The maximum for both variables is attained if the abatement
policy level verifies:
max =  + 1  (16)
Accordingly, in a perpetual growing steady state, if the level of abatement policy is
initially low (i.e., 0    max), it is possible for the government to improve environmen-
tal quality and foster long-term growth. The crucial issue however, concerns the impact
of such policy on welfare, which we tackle next.
3.2.2 Abatement policy choice and welfare
In this sub-section, we determine the abatement policy level which maximises individ-
uals’ welfare in the Malthusian steady state,   and in the perpetual growing one,
 . Under the maintained assumption that the parameters of the model verify 0 
 ()1− (1 + )1−  1 with  =  to ensure a bounded utility level at the steady
state, we use (4), Proposition 1 and Appendix 5.1 to find the utility of an individual at
time :
 = [() (
)]1−
(1− )
()1−
1−  ()1− (1 + )1−   =
Deriving this expression with respect to   we obtain:


1
 =
⎡
⎣
(1−)
 +
(1−)



+(1−)()
−(1+)1−
1−()1−(1+)1−
 +
(1−)()1−(1+)−
1−()1−(1+)1−


⎤
⎦   = (17)
From equation (17), we can count four channels through which the abatement policy
can impact on individuals’ welfare. Starting with the first term on the right hand side
of (17), we observe that this eﬀect is common to both the Malthusian and perpetual
growing steady states. It represents the direct (positive) eﬀect on welfare of a more
stringent policy. That is, a better environmental quality is welfare enhancing simply
because it is an argument of individuals’ utility function. The second term, on the other
hand, represents a reduction in welfare coming from the consumption loss incurred due to a
positive policy change. A more stringent policy is indeed synonymous of a greater amount
of resources allocated to abatement. This means, ceteris paribus, that individuals have
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fewer resources left for private consumption. The size of this eﬀect is diﬀerent whether
the economy is stuck in the Malthusian steady state or has reached a state of perpetual
development. We have:
 ()
 = − (1−  )− (1− ) 

 − 

 
and
 ()
 = − (1− )− (1− ) 

 −



 − 
()
 
Simple manipulations of these two expressions show that | ()  |  | ()  |
if   max . I.e., the consumption loss incurred by individuals is lower in a Malthusian
steady state than in a state of perpetual growth. This is because in the Malthusian
steady state, individuals reduce their fertility rate and reallocate labour-time to output
production. In the perpetual growing steady state, however, individuals allocate more
resources to education and more labour-time to fertility.
Finally, the third and fourth terms on the second line of the right hand side of (17)
represent the welfare impact of the policy coming from the change in the number of
children per individual,   =  and growth,   = . As explained in the
previous sub-section, the eﬀect on the number of children per individual is negative in the
Malthusian steady state, while its sign depends on the initial value of the policy in the
perpetual growing steady state (i.e. whether   max or   max). Regarding growth,
this eﬀect is zero in the Malthusian steady state due to the properties of this latter, but is
strictly positive (negative) in the perpetual growing steady state if   max (  max).
Gathering the results depicted above, we can deduce that the welfare maximising
abatement policy level in the Malthusian and perpetual growing steady states verify:
0      18 Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that the strength of
the negative welfare impact of pollution, , is not too high (as suggested by van Ewijk
and van Wijnbergen, 1995), we can expect   max = ( + 1) (see equation 16).
Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 2 As long as the strength of the negative impact of pollution on welfare, ,
8We can easily check that, in the case  = 0  should be set to zero. Of course, such solution is
valid only if the functional form given in footnote 3 prevails.
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is not too high, the optimal policy levels in the Malthusian and perpetual growing steady
states verify: 0      max = ( + 1)  1
Proposition 2 states that the optimal abatement policy level should be set higher in the
perpetual growing economy than in the Malthusian steady state. Interestingly, this result
fits with the economic intuition. But more importantly, it implies that if the government
were to implement  , there should not be any trade oﬀ between environmental quality,
welfare and growth in the long run in the perpetual growing steady state if, at the outset,
the abatement policy level is not too stringent (i.e.   max ). Therefore, Proposition 2
implies:
Corollary 1 In a perpetual growing economy, as long as the strength of the negative
impact of pollution on welfare, , is not too high, and if the actual abatement policy
verifies 0      a more stringent abatement policy should lead to a reduction of
pollution emissions and an increase of long-term growth and welfare.
Let us mention that, although we have characterised the welfare maximising abatement
policy level in the Malthusian steady state,  , we doubt if it is optimal for a government
to actually implement such policy. Put diﬀerently, we wonder if the main goal of the
government should not be, instead, to attempt to reach the perpetual growing steady
state first, and then, later, implement the welfare maximising policy,  . We raise this
issue because we can observe that condition (12) becomes less stringent as  increases
when   max initially. Intuitively, when the government chooses to increase the level
of the abatement policy in the Malthusian steady state, it, in turn, decreases the rate of
return to investments in the number of children parents choose to bring up. Therefore, it
aﬀects the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ on children towards quality and makes this steady
state less likely to occur.9 In other words, the abatement policy can serve as an instrument
of economic development in the sense that it can be used to switch the economy from
a Malthusian steady state (or poverty trap) to a state of perpetual growth. To verify
this noteworthy hypothesis, it is necessary to characterise the transitional dynamics of
9We show in Appendix 5.1.3 that, as the abatement policy level increases, the minimum level of human
capital required to switch from the Malthusian to the perpetually growing steady state decreases.
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the model to clearly assess the eﬀects of a change in the abatement policy level both on
impact and during the adjustment path. We thus tackle this important issue in the next
section.
3.3 Transitional dynamics
3.3.1 Characterisation
We develop a 2 × 2 linearised system in the relative amount of resources devoted to
human capital,  and human capital itself, , around the asymptotic steady state
of perpetual development. For simplicity, we give a more intuitive exposition here, and
relegate the more formal details to Appendix 5.2.
To proceed, we first re-write the model in deviation from the reference paths for
the number of children, , relative investments to human capital accumulation, ,
consumption,  and human capital, , during the transition. We can show that the
change in the number of children is linked to the change in the relative amount of resources
devoted to human capital according to the following relation:
∆ = −Γ∆ ()  (18)
where, for any variable  we use the standard notation ∆ = +1 −  and:
Γ ≡
(1−)()+[()]2
[(1−)+()]2 +

(1−)(−)−()

 +
(1−)+()
(1−)(−)−()
 0
Equation (18) shows that the number of children and educational eﬀort move in oppo-
site directions both on impact and during transition. Using this information, we obtain
that, along the transition, the consumption path is given by
∆
 = Υ∆ () +
∆
 
where
Υ ≡
∙ (1− ) () + ()2
[(1− )  + ()]2 −
Γ

¸
 0
Finally, after tedious computations, we obtain the following system:
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⎡
⎣
∆+1
+1
∆ (+1+1)
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ 1
1
()
0 Ω
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
∆
∆ ()
⎤
⎦  (19)
where
0  Ω ≡
Γ
 − () + Υ
Υ− Γ
1−
 1 (20)
We assume that the parameters of the model are such that 0  Ω  1 to ensure
saddle-point stability and avoid oscillatory trajectories. Requiring saddle-point stability
makes sense as  is a “jump variable” (closely linked to , the number of children
per parent). Human capital, , however, is a state variable and likely to change more
slowly: it is a “predetermined” variable. We now turn to the analysis of an abatement
policy change.
3.3.2 The great transition
In this part, we show that the abatement policy can serve as an instrument to switch an
economy from the Malthusian poverty trap to a state of perpetual economic development.
As mentioned before, the mechanism allowing such result relies on the notion that a
positive change in the abatement policy level should increase the return to investment in
children’s education relative to the return to investment in children’s quantity. In other
words, the policy change aﬀects the opportunity cost of rising additional children and then
induces individuals to start investing in their education. This, in turn, should initiate the
great transition to the state of perpetual development.
Let us assume that the economy is initially in the Malthusian steady state (i.e.  = 0)
with an abatement policy level verifying: 0       (see Proposition 2). At time
 = 0 the government decides to implement a permanent and marginal increase in  . At
the time of the policy change,  = 0 there is an increase in the return to investment in
children’s education (quality) relative to the return in investment in children’s quantity.
Moreover, as shown in Appendix 6.1, the minimum level of human capital to switch from
the Malthusian to the perpetual growing steady state becomes lower. Thus, this can
induce individuals to start investing in their children’s education: we obtain a jump of the
relative amount of resources devoted to human capital given by 00 (see 3) which puts
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the economy on a state of perpetual development. To illustrate this result, a numerical
simulation is conducted in Appendix 5.2.
After the policy change, from (19), we can check that  decreases to its steady-state
value given by (13), i.e. attains it from above (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 about here
This means that the number of children per individual jumps down on impact and
then sluggishly decreases to its new steady state value (see Figure 2 and equation 18 in
Appendix 6.2).
Figure 2 about here
Finally, human capital, state variable, does not change on impact as 0 = 0−10+
0 = 0 and 0−1 = 0 in the Malthusian steady state. Afterwards, however, due to the
strictly positive investments,  human capital increases and its growth rate sluggishly
approaches its steady state from below (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 about here
To summarise, we can state:
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions 0      1 and the economy is stuck in a
Malthusian poverty trap, a more stringent abatement policy can initiate the great transi-
tion to a self-sustained growth steady state. During the transition, individuals invest an
increasing amount of resources in education and reduce their fertility rate. As a result,
growth and welfare increase.
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4 Conclusion
In a simple model of overlapping generations with endogenous fertility inspired by BMT,
we have investigated the eﬀects of a pollution abatement policy supported by a flat income
tax rate. Growth results from human capital, financed by the provision of education from
parents to children, and aided by environmental quality. The tax-supported abatement
policy induces a fundamental trade-oﬀ between resources available for private use and
growth because environmental quality enhances the generation of human capital.
As long as the tax rate is below its welfare maximising level, we have shown that the
government can foster both growth and environmental quality without any conflict be-
tween the two goals. Moreover, a more intensive abatement policy (a higher tax rate) may
lower the threshold of the initial human capital that diﬀerentiates the Malthusian from
the perpetually growing steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, this policy may facilitate a
switch from stagnation to perpetual growth.
For analytical tractability, and for the purpose of establishing a first set of relevant
results, we have opted for the simplest endogenous growth framework in which individuals
decide both investments in human capital accumulation and the number of children to
bring up. Another important channel through which pollution can aﬀect growth and wel-
fare is individuals’ life expectancy (see, e.g. Chakraborty, 2004; Gutierrez, 2008; Pautrel,
2008, 2009; Varvarigos, 2010). Thus, assuming that the length of individuals’s second
period of life depends on pollution emissions, appears as a natural extension of our frame-
work. Another possible limitation of our work is that, although fertility is treated as
endogenous, the role of population growth is not explicitly treated: a greater population
may for instance cause greater congestion and pollution eﬀects, notably in mega-cities
of developing countries. As mentioned by Schou (2002), such problems naturally call for
family planning policies to regulate these additional externalities. It would then be inter-
esting to see how these notions may aﬀect the results derived in the present paper. We
must also admit that the present analysis did not tackle the important issue
of the relation between environment and distribution. As argued by Aloi and
Tournemaine (2013), the prevailing debate is whether the trade-oﬀ between
tighter environmental protection and faster economic growth aﬀects more the
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poor than the rich. In light of the present article, the policy could also aﬀect
the quality-quantity on children. Therefore, it would be interesting to take
into account this feature to assess whether there could be a conflict between
environmental and distributional concerns. Finally, an important issue which
remains open at this stage but is worth to tackle concerns the confrontation
of the model to real world data to test the validity of its results. This is
obviously an empirical question which goes beyond the scope of the present
article and could be the object of another research of its own.
5 Appendix
5.1 Steady state
5.1.1 Malthusian steady state
As explained in the main text, in a Malthusian steady state, adult individuals do not
invest in human capital:  = 0 in all periods. This implies that economic growth is zero:
+1 =  = 0 in all periods. Then, the levels of consumption and utility of any individual
are respectively given by  = +1 and  = +1 in all periods. Using this information,
equation (12) follows directly from equation (10) where  = +1 This condition must
hold with strict inequality because we have a corner solution. To compute (11), we use
(4), (7) and the fact that  = +1 and  = +1 in all periods.
5.1.2 Perpetual growing steady state
When growth is strictly positive, the level of innate human capital of an individual, 0
and the fixed cost of raising a child in terms of the consumption good,  , become negligible
in the long-run (as ratios over ). Thus, we can skip these variables in the computation
of the steady state. From (3) and (5), we have: 1 +  = +1 = +1 = () at
the steady state. As equation (8) reads with equality with strictly positive investments
in education, we can combine this equation with (7) to obtain:
+1
 =

h
(1− )  + 
i
(1− )
+1
+1
+1
+1  (21)
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Since the growth rate of human capital and consumption are the same at steady state,
we have
+1
+1
+1
+1 =
+1+1
+1+1 =
+1+1
+1+1 =
+1
+1
+1
+1 
Assuming that the economy has reached the steady state, recursive substitution leads to
+1 = [(+1) (
)]1−
1− 
∞P
=0
£ ()1− (1 + )1−¤ 
Thus, from the above equation we have
+1
+1
+1
+1 = 1−  (22)
Plugging the above result in (21), we obtain  Then, using (10) which holds with
equality, we obtain 
5.1.3 Intermediate steady state
In this sub-section, we characterise the intermediate state of development. As growth is
zero in the intermediate steady state, from (10), the number of children per individual is
given by
 (1− ) (b)− ( − b) = 1 (23)
where a "b" on a variable denotes its value in steady state. As in the main text, we can
easily check from (23) that there exists a tax value for which the number of children is
maximum. It is given by:  = max = ( + 1)
Then, from (4) we obtain
 (1− )
(1− ) [(b) − b] = (1− ) b+ (b+ )(1− ) ( − b)b− (b+ ) b (24)
and from (3), the level of investment in education, b is given by
b = b− 0  (25)
It is interesting to note that, for   max  b  0 and for  close enough to
max (i.e.  ≈ max ), the threshold level of human capital, b, required to switch to the
self sustained growth steady state is negatively related with  : b  0 confirming
the result depicted in the main text. We can indeed compute
b
 =max = −
−1
 + 1  0
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5.2 Transitional dynamics
5.2.1 Characterisation
Combining (7) and (8) (with equality in (8) as we are considering the endogenous growth
case of   0), we obtain
+1
+1 =
(1− )

+1
[(1− )  + ( + )] 
which is a diﬀerential equation in +1 and +1+1. The solution is:
+1 = Θ exp
∙
(1− )

+1
[(1− )  + ( + )]
¸

where Θ is a variable independent of +1 that must grow at the same rate as ()1− (see
equation 7). For simplicity, we specify Θ = ()1−. Plugging back the above equation in
(7), and skipping the terms  and 0 which do not play any role in the growing steady
state, we obtain
 (1− ) ()− exp
∙
(1− ) ()
(1− )  + ()
¸
= [(1− )  + ()] ()−1 (1−)
Linarising this equation around the steady state of perpetual development, we get
−∆ −
∙ (1− ) () + ()2
[(1− )  + ()]2
¸
∆ () = ∆ −
∆
  (26)
Then, combining (5) and (6), and proceeding in the same way as before, we get
∆
 =
− (1−)+()
(1−)(−)−()∆ + ∆
− ()
(1−)(−)−()
∆()
()
 (27)
Finally, linearisation of (3) yields
∆+1
+1 −
∆
 =
∆ ()
()  (28)
and linearisation of (10) yields

µ∆+1
+1 −
∆

¶
= −∆ −

1− ∆+1 (29)
Equations (26), (27), (28) and (29) is a 4× 4 system in deviation from the reference
paths for the number of children, , relative investments to human capital accumulation,
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, consumption,  and human capital, . Now, the strategy is to reduce this system
to a 2× 2 system in deviation from the reference paths for  and . To do it, we use
(26) and (27) to eliminate ∆ and ∆. We obtain
∆ = −∆ () 
at each instant, with
Γ =
(1−)()+()2
[(1−)+()]2 +

(1−)(−)−()

 +
(1−)+()
(1−)(−)−()
 0
and
∆
 = ∆ () +
∆
 
with
Υ =  (1− ) () + ()
2
[(1− )  + ()]2 −

  0
as long as ∙ ( − ) + (1− )
 (1− )
¸ ∙
(1− )  (1− )
( − )
¸
 1
This latter condition is assumed to be verified to ensure a negative relation between
consumption and investments in education (see Section 2).
Plugging these results in (29), we obtain
∆ (+1+1) = Ω∆ () 
with
Ω =

 − () + 
 − 
1−

which, combined with equation (29) leads to the system (19).
5.2.2 Illustration of the great transition through a simple numerical example
In this part, we run a simple numerical simulation to show how the abatement policy can
serve as an instrument to switch an economy from the Malthusian poverty trap to a state
of perpetual economic development. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the
numerical exercise performed here only provides a rough assessment of the mechanisms
at work. It is only used to support of the basic economic intuition given in the main text.
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To calibrate the model, we use similar benchmark parameter values as BMT (1990).
Regarding the level of the abatement policy and parameters linked to the pollution tech-
nology, we follow Pautrel (2008, 2009); in particular, as observed from the data, we set
the share of resources to abatement technologies around 2-5 percent. Table 1 summarizes
the benchmark value of parameters.
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Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
Description Parameter Benchmark value
Time endowment  1.3
Elasticity of
environmental quality
 1.3
Impact of environmental
quality on education
 0.05
Fixed cost of good
of bringing up a child
 0.28
Fixed cost of time
of bringing up a child
 0.15
Elasticity of altruism  0.25
Degree of altruism  0.4
Productivity in
education
 4.4
Elasticity of substitution
in the utility
 0.5
Innate skills 0 1
Abatement policy level  0.03
0.05
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